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NOTE
GRAFFITI MUSEUM:
A FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENT FOR
PROTECTING UNCOMMISSIONED ART
ON PRIVATE PROPERTY
Margaret L. Mettler*
Graffiti has long been a target of municipal legislation that aims to pre-
serve property values, public safety, and aesthetic integrity in the
community. Not only are graffitists at risk of criminal prosecution but
property owners are subject to civil and criminal penalties for harboring
graffiti on their land. Since the 1990s, most U.S. cities have promulgated
graffiti abatement ordinances that require private property owners to re-
move graffiti from their land, often at their own expense. These ordinances
define graffiti broadly to include essentially any surface marking applied
without advance authorization from the property owner.
Meanwhile, graffiti has risen in prominence as a legitimate art form, be-
ginning in the 1960s and most recently with the contributions of street
artists such as Banksy and Shepard Fairey. Some property owners may find
themselves fortuitous recipients of "graffiti" they deem art and want to
preserve in spite of graffiti abatement ordinances and sign regulations re-
quiring the work's removal. This Note argues that private property owners
who wish to preserve uncommissioned art on their land can challenge
these laws under the First Amendment, claiming that, as applied, regula-
tions requiring removal are unconstitutional because they leave the
property owner insufficient alternative channels for expression.
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INTRODUCTION
Rare bookstore proprietor Hedger Breed arrived at his Ypsilanti, Michi-
gan, shop one day and unexpectedly discovered an image spray-painted on
the building. The stenciled graphic, about four square feet in area, consisted
of a red heart perched atop the head of a human figure, below which a black
object pointed toward the figure's open mouth.2 One interpretation is that the
figure is screaming and pointing a handgun at its mouth,3 although-as with
all art-other interpretations are possible.4 Mr. Breed, who holds a fine arts
degree and formerly managed an art gallery, found the piece "charming,"
"evocative," and reminiscent of the work of British street artist Banksy.s He
decided to preserve it. An Ypsilanti ordinance officer, however, explained to
Mr. Breed that he would have to remove the graphic per the city's graffiti
abatement law,6 which requires that property owners remove all graffiti from
their property at their own expense.7
1. Jordan Miller, Businessman Sees Art, City Sees Graffiti, ANN ARBOR NEWS, Jan. 14,
2008, http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/2008/01/businessowner sees-it as-art.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. For a photograph of the graffiti in question, see id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. YPSILANTI, MICH., ORDINANCES pt. II, ch. 42, art. II, § 42-46(c) (Supp. 2011) ("It is
the duty of both the owner of the property to which the graffiti has been applied, and any per-
son who may be in possession or has the right to possess such property, to at all times keep
such property clear and free of graffiti."); id. § 42-49 ("It shall be the responsibility of the
owner of any property marked or defaced as defined in this section ... to remove or paint over
such markings .... Any owner removing such markings ... may be entitled to restitution ...
for the cost of removing these markings."). The City of Ypsilanti defines "graffiti" broadly to
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Dismayed by the ordinance, Mr. Breed went before the Ypsilanti City
Council to plead his case. Mr. Breed explained that he understood the law's
purpose, but that he nonetheless was "fond of the graffiti and fe[lt] it pro-
mote[d] art in the city."' 8 Ypsilanti's mayor was unrelenting: Mr. Breed's
only options, the mayor advised, were to "go to court or petition the Council
for an ordinance change."9 Despite his perseverance, Mr. Breed's efforts to
preserve the graffiti were unavailing, and he ultimately agreed to remove it
from his building. 10 Today, Ypsilanti's graffiti ordinance remains the same as
it was four years ago when Mr. Breed discovered the graphic.
Property owners like Mr. Breed who want to keep graffiti or uncommis-
sioned street art" on their property must contend with two main forms of
regulation. The first are nuisance ordinances, similar to the one enacted by
the City of Ypsilanti, that require property owners to remove all graffiti from
their property. The second are sign regulations governing signs' size, loca-
tion, and similarly objective characteristics.
This Note argues that private property owners 12 who wish to keep un-
commissioned art on their property can successfully claim that graffiti
abatement ordinances and sign regulations, as applied, violate their First
Amendment speech rights. Part I provides an overview of the modern his-
tory of graffiti and street art, defines these terms, and describes the general
contours of graffiti abatement ordinances and sign regulations. Part II pos-
its that uncommissioned art is the property owner's expression and thus
warrants First Amendment protection. Part III contends that the time,
place, and manner test is appropriate for evaluating the constitutionality of
land-use ordinances regulating uncommissioned art. Finally, Part IV ar-
gues that when applied to uncommissioned art on private property, these
regulations fail the time, place, and manner test by leaving the property
owner insufficient alternative channels for expression, and are thus uncon-
stitutional.
I. THE ART-LAW DIVIDE
While the art world embraces at least some graffiti as legitimate art, the
law precludes individual assessment of graffiti based on artistic merit and
include "any paint, spray paint, pigment or similar means [used] to injure, deface or destroy
any public or private property." Id. § 42-47. For further discussion of graffiti abatement ordi-
nances, see infra Section I.C. 1.
8. Council Meeting Minutes, CITY OF YPSILANTI 3 (Feb. 5, 2008), https://
cityofypsilanti.ewashtenaw.org/bd-city-council/minutes/2008/02-05-08-approved-minutes.
9. Id.
10. Mr. Breed's efforts included contacting the Ypsilanti Historic District Commission,
City Attorney, and City Manager; none were receptive to his plight. E-mail from C. Hedger
Breed to Margaret L. Mettler (Feb. 19, 2012, 09:15 PM EST) (on file with author).
11. For definitions of "graffiti" and "uncommissioned art" as they are used in this Note,
see infra Section I.B.
12. This Note addresses arguments to preserve uncommissioned art on private residen-
tial and commercial property. Works situated on public property-including bridges, roads,
monuments, and other government-owned structures-are outside the scope of this Note.
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instead uniformly regards it as a nuisance. This Part highlights these divergent
perspectives. Section I.A describes the origins of graffiti, the birth of the
street art movement, and the art world's recognition of these genres. Section
I.B defines the terms "graffiti" and "uncommissioned art" as they are used in
this Note. Lastly, Section I.C outlines the ordinances cities have developed
to abate graffiti and regulate signage.
A. Graffiti in Mainstream Culture
Despite graffiti having roots in ancient Greek and Roman culture, 13 graf-
fiti writing emerged in the 1960s in Philadelphia 4 and marked a shift from
the gang-related, territorial graffiti that flourished in earlier years toward the
rising prominence of graffiti as an art form. 5 Graffiti writing is a stylized
form of letter composition-also known as tagging-that typically consists
of the artist's name or a pseudonym. 16 Street art-essentially "[aill art on the
street that's not graffti"' 7-is an outgrowth of the graffiti writing move-
ment.'8 New York artists such as Jenny Holzer and Richard Hambleton in
the mid-1970s, and later Keith Haring and Jean-Michel Basquiat, were some
of the first associated with the burgeoning street art movement.' 9 Today, the
line that distinguishes street art from graffiti writing is blurred, with many
artists producing works in both genres during their careers.2"
A new generation of street artists has revitalized interest in the graffiti
and street art genres and imbued them with fresh meaning. Bristol, England,
native Banksy2" is likely the most well-known artist affiliated with the street
13. The term "graffiti" described inscriptions on ancient ruins, through which people
communicated about daily life. SCAPE MARTINEZ, GRAFF: THE ART & TECHNIQUE OF
GRAFFITI 8 (2009); see also Carlo McCormick, The Writing on the Wall, in ART IN THE
STREETS 20 (Jeffrey Deitch et al. eds., 2011).
14. See GREGORY J. SNYDER, GRAFFITI LIVES: BEYOND THE TAG IN NEW YORK'S UR-
BAN UNDERGROUND 23 (2009).
15. CEDAR LEWISOHN, STREET ART: THE GRAFFITI REVOLUTION 31 (2008) ("Tagging
was invented in the mid-1960s.... [The graffiti before 1965] had largely been gang-related and
ha[d] its own history and traditions.... [Gang graffiti] is separate from graffiti writing. After
around 1970, we can clearly start to identify people doing graffiti writing as opposed to gang
graffiti.").
16. See LISA GOTTLIEB, GRAFFITI ART STYLES: A CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM AND THEO-
RETICAL ANALYSIS 35 (2008).
17. LEWISOHN, supra note 15, at 23 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). This definition of street art is attributed to John Fekner, one of the first artists affiliated
with the genre. Id. For a good overview of how the art world distinguishes graffiti from street
art, see id. at 15-23. See Section I.B for definitions of key terms used in this Note.
18. LEWISOHN, supra note 15, at 15.
19. Id. at 79; see also McCormick, supra note 13, at 24.
20. See, e.g., LEWISOHN, supra note 15, at 117 ("Banksy comes from a graffiti-writing
background, but his work now fits much more into a street-art model.").
21. See generally BAN KSY, http://www.banksy.co.uk/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
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art movement today. 22 Though he aims to remain anonymous 23 and is known
only by his pseudonym,24 Banksy is renowned for stenciling irreverent, politi-
cally charged street art pieces on walls around the globe.25 Banksy's street
notoriety has created a vigorous demand for his canvas-based works, which
routinely sell through mainstream galleries. 26 But despite his commercial
success, Banksy continues to create uncompensated, uncommissioned street
art on walls and bridges throughout the world.
Street art's rising popularity in recent years is reflected in both films and
museum exhibits recognizing the genre. Banksy is credited with directing
the 2010 Oscar-nominated documentary Exit Through the Gift Shop, which
depicts a thriving, energetic street art subculture.27 Among the film's dozens
of subjects is Los Angeles-based street artist Shepard Fairey,25 known for
his "Obey" sticker campaign featuring wrestler Andrd the Giant, and for
creating the iconic "Hope" poster promoting then-presidential candidate
Barack Obama.29 The film also features the Space Invaders video game-
inspired work of artist Invader, who cleverly integrates tiled mosaics into
urban landscapes in cities around the world.30 Film is not the only medium
through which street artists have been acknowledged recently. The Museum
of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles hosted "Art in the Streets" during the
summer of 2011,31 one of the first exhibits ever to showcase street art and
22. See LEWISOHN, supra note 15, at 120 ("In terms of impact and raising public
awareness, Banksy's career is unmatched.").
23. Banksy, in CURRENT BIOGRAPHY YEARBOOK 2009, at 40, 41 (Clifford Thomas et al.
eds., 2009) ("Banksy's refusal to reveal his real name or any other information about himself,
and his absence from exhibitions of his work, have drawn much attention in the media and
helped to increase his prominence in the art world.").
24. Dan Karmel, Off the Wall: Abandonment and the First Sale Doctrine, 45 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PRoas. 353, 354 n.4 (2012) ("Banksy is a pseudonym, and the artist's true identity
is the subject of febrile speculation." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
25. Banksy, supra note 23, at 40.
26. See, e.g., 'Brangelina' Spend £1 Million on Banksy Work at Contemporary Art
Auction in London, DAILY MAIL, Oct. 12, 2007, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-
487230/Brangelina-spend- 1 -million-Banksy-work-contemporary-art-auction-London.html.
27. ExIT THROUGH THE GIFT SHOP (Paranoid Pictures 2010); Telephone Interview by
Lynn Neary with Jaimie D'Cruz, Producer (Feb. 22, 2011), available at http://www.npr.org/
2011/02/22/133966402/banksys-exit-reveals-street-art-world-sort-of.
28. EXIT THROUGH THE GIw SHOP, supra note 27. See generally OBEY,
http://obeygiant.com (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
29. Randy Kennedy, Artist Sues the A.P over Obama Image, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009,
at Cl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/arts/design/l0fair.html.
30. John Horn & Chris Lee, Sundance Film Festival: In and Out of the Shadows with
Banksy, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, at D1; EXIT THROUGH THE GIFT SHOP, supra note 27. See
generally SPACE INVADERS, http://www.space-invaders.com (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
31. Andrew Russeth, L.A. MOCA's Street-Art Show Sets Attendance Record, N.Y.
OBSERVER, Aug. 10, 2011, http://www.observer.com/2011/08/1-a-mocas-street-art-show-sets-
attendance-record.
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graffiti. 32 The show was extraordinarily popular, drawing more visitors than
any other exhibit in the museum's history.33
B. Graffiti and Uncommissioned Art Defined
Perhaps in part due to the art world's recognition of street art and the
negative connotations evoked by the word "graffiti," art historians seem reti-
cent to refer to artistically meritorious works as "graffiti," preferring the term
"street art" instead.34 The graffiti-street art distinction has no legal signifi-
cance, however, and municipal ordinances define graffiti far more broadly
than the popular conception of the term.35 Therefore, in the interest of clari-
ty, this Note defines a few key terms early in its analysis.
First, "graffiti" in this Note means any unsanctioned marking of a sur-
face. This expansive definition reflects how municipalities define the term. It
is important to note that this conception of graffiti encompasses what many
in the art world call "street art" as well as other related genres-including
murals, pieces, throw-ups, graffiti writing, and gang graffiti3 6-as long as
the work in question is created without prior authorization from the property
owner. Second, "uncommissioned art" in this Note means any graffiti37 that
a property owner wishes to keep on his private property.38
Importantly, this Note does not attempt to define art in any normative
sense, nor does it argue that the First Amendment only protects those works
meeting some objective standard of beauty. Defining art is a notoriously
difficult proposition, one courts are reticent to tackle.39 This Note advocates
32. See Guy Trebay, A Risk-Taker's Debut, N.Y TIMEs, Apr. 24, 2011, at ST1, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/24/fashion/24DEITCHhtml.
33. Russeth, supra note 31.
34. See LEWISOHN, supra note 15, at 18 ("One of the principle [sic] reasons for making
a distinction between street art and graffiti writing is that graffiti has such a bad public reputa-
tion.").
35. See, e.g., L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.2(E) (2010) (" 'Graf-
fiti' means any form of unauthorized inscription, word, figure or design which is marked,
etched, scratched, drawn, sprayed, painted or otherwise affixed to or on any surface of public
or private property, including but not limited to, buildings, walls, signs, structures or places, or
other surfaces... ").
36. Much scholarly literature is devoted to defining and distinguishing these categories,
and this Note does not attempt to replicate that analysis. For a good discussion of the taxono-
my, see Marisa A. Gomez, Note, The Writing on Our Walls: Finding Solutions Through
Distinguishing Graffiti Art from Graffiti Vandalism, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 633, 644-51
(1993), and Lori L. Hanesworth, Are They Graffiti Artists or Vandals? Should They Be Able or
Caned?: A Look at the Latest Legislative Attempts to Eradicate Graffiti, 6 DEPAuL-LCA J.
ART & ENT. L. 225, 226-27 (1996).
37. As defined in this Note.
38. Inclusion of the modifier "uncommissioned" in the term "uncommissioned art" is
necessary to avoid confusion with the term "art" in its more general sense.
39. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("[Olne man's vulgarity is
another's lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make
principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so
largely to the individual."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954) ("Individual perception
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leaving this task in the hands of property owners-whatever they deem wor-
thy of preservation should be considered "art." Consequently, the argument
set forth in this Note applies with equal force to gang scrawls as it does to
intricate murals. The only limitations to the scope of works protected are
those imposed by existing First Amendment doctrines. 4°
In a related vein, property owners could ostensibly invoke this argument
even if they merely seek to avoid paying the cost of graffiti abatement and
only claim their graffiti is art, but do not genuinely believe it. Promoting
broad social values, wholly separate from the agenda of an individual
speaker, is perhaps the most essential function of the free speech clause.
41
Among these "greater good" objectives are ensuring the free flow of ideas42
and "checking the abuse of official [governmental] power."43 Requiring
property owners seeking First Amendment protection for uncommissioned
art to prove the authenticity of their message-that is, to show that they sin-
cerely believe their graffiti is art-would do little to advance this important
First Amendment function. Thus, this Note assumes that if a property own-
er's message (artwork) is protected by the free speech clause, it is irrelevant
whether that message is espoused by the speaker (property owner) out of
sincerity, sarcasm, laziness, or any other motivation. 4
C. Municipal Ordinances and Regulations
Section I.C. 1 describes how municipalities treat graffiti legislatively by
surveying nuisance abatement ordinances that aim to eliminate graffiti.
of the beautiful is too varied ... to permit a narrow or rigid concept of art."); Bleistein v. Don-
aldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) ("It would be a dangerous undertaking
for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of picto-
rial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits."); Martin v. City of
Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 1999) ("We are not art critics, do not pretend to be
and do not need to be to decide this case.").
40. For instance, graffiti that meets the Brandenburg incitement test would not be pro-
tected. See infra Section UI.C.
41. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269, 271 (1964) ("Authoritative
interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an
exception for any test of truth-whether administered by judges, juries, or administrative
officials-and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker."); Ira C.
Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONN. L.
REV. 739, 776 (1986) ("[A] critical difference between free speech claims and free exercise
claims is that only the latter trigger a test of sincerity."); Geoffrey S. Frankel, Note, Untan-
gling First Amendment Values: The Prisoners' Dilemma, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1614, 1638
(1991) ("[F]ree speech doctrine, which is focused on the external value of speech, is uncon-
cerned with whether the speaker truly believes in his message.").
42. See infra notes 187-188 and accompanying text; see also JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY 121-22 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003).
43. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 528 (1977).
44. Lest readers fear abuse of this argument by indolent property owners hoping to
avoid paying for graffiti abatement, the expense of litigating the constitutional challenge dis-
cussed in this Note would likely impose a de facto subjective value requirement, effectively
limiting the argument to those who find at least some artistic merit in the graffiti.
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Section I.C.2 discusses sign regulations, as uncommissioned art would also
typically fall within their purview. Both forms of land-use regulation vary
by city. This Section examines New York's and Los Angeles's codes as
examples to demonstrate a range of approaches and highlight certain com-
monalities across municipalities' regulations.
1. Graffiti Abatement Ordinances
Cities typically view graffiti as a threat to the quality of community
life, 45 and they spend millions of dollars to remove it from public and pri-
vate property.46 Among municipalities' codified efforts to eliminate graffiti
are regulations that deem graffiti a nuisance per se47 and mandate its abate-
ment at the property owner's expense, with or without the owner's consent. 48
New York's development of its graffiti abatement ordinance roughly par-
allels the trajectory of similar laws in other U.S. cities. Graffiti regulation
efforts in New York from the 1970s through the early 1990s focused on pe-
nalizing vandals (graffitists) and restricting the sale of spray-paint and other
materials used to create graffiti. 49 When Mayor Rudolph Giuliani took office
in 1994, however, he made graffiti abatement a priority, establishing the
city's Anti-Graffiti Task Force in 19950 and overseeing a ten-fold increase
in the number of graffiti-writer arrests from 1994 to 1998.5l
Continuing Giuliani's tough-on-graffiti mentality, New York's City
Council passed a bill in 2005 that for the first time "imposed an affirmative
duty on property owners to keep their property free of graffiti. 52 Section 10-
117.3 of the New York City Administrative Code, which codifies a modified
version of the 2005 law5 3 and remains in force today, permits city authorities
45. E.g., L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. IV, art. 14, §§ 49.84.1(A)-(C) (2010) (de-
scribing graffiti as "a blighting element that leads to depreciation of the value of property[;]...
create[s] fear and insecurity within the community[;]" and "leads to violence, genuine threats
to life, and the perpetuation of gangs, gang violence, and gang territories").
46. E.g., DEBORAH LAMM WEISEL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROBLEM-ORIENTED
GUIDES FOR POLICE PROBLEM-SPECIFIC GUIDES SERIES No. 9, GRAFFITI 2 (2004), available at
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/el1011354.pdf ("[A]n estimated $12 billion a year is spent
cleaning up graffiti in the United States."); Editorial, Cleaning Up Graffiti's Act, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2011, at A23, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/04/opinionla-ed-
graffiti-20110904 ("Los Angeles spent $7.1 million last year cleaning graffiti.").
47. E.g., L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.6.
48. E.g., S.F., CAL., PUBLIC WORKS CODE art. 23, § 1304(a) (Supp. 2009). Much of the
impetus for graffiti cleanup efforts stems from the alleged connection between graffiti and
increased crime, a somewhat spurious rationale discussed in more detail infra in Section II.C.
49. Bradley McCormick, City Drafts Property Owners for Fight Against Graffiti, 16
CITY L. 25, 25 (2010).
50. Charisse Jones, Leaving Their Mark Behind, USA TODAY, NoV. 20, 2000, at Al9.
51. Nina Siegal, From the Subways to the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1999, http://
www.nytimes.com/1999/08/22/nyregion/from-the-subways-to-the-streets.html?pagewanted=all
&src=pm.
52. McCormick, supra note 49.
53. See id.
[Vol. 111:249
Graffiti Museum
to issue property owners a notice of nuisance immediately upon finding
graffiti on their property.54 Importantly, New York's ordinance makes the
nuisance declaration a rebuttable presumption, subject to contrary expres-
sion by the property owner that he wishes to keep the graffiti. 55 Silence from
the property owner gives the city consent to enter the property and remove
the graffiti. 56 Though the rebuttable presumption approach eliminates the
First Amendment problem posed by one type of ordinance-graffiti abate-
ment laws-property owners would still have to contend with sign
regulations, which could independently preclude the property owner from
preserving the art, thus again raising a First Amendment issue. 7
Most cities do not make the graffiti nuisance declaration a rebuttable
presumption, however. The Los Angeles abatement ordinance, for instance,
prohibits property owners from preserving graffiti even if they wish to keep
it, 58 and gives the city authority to enter a property owner's land and remove
the graffiti if the property owner refuses to comply with an abatement re-
quest.59 The ordinance also subjects a noncompliant property owner to
criminal misdemeanor liability.6"
2. Sign Regulations
Even if uncommissioned art could avoid abatement under a city's nui-
sance ordinances, it might still run afoul of sign regulations. Most cities
regulate signs as part of their zoning schemes or through separate sign con-
trol ordinances, imposing restrictions on signs' location, size, and similarly
objective characteristics. 6'
New York's sign regulations are representative of many U.S. cities' laws.
In residential districts, sign height cannot exceed that of either the ground
54. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE tit. 10, ch. 1, § 10-117.3 (2010).
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. See infra Section I.C.2.
58. L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.3(B) (2010) (making it a
crime for property owners to harbor any graffiti on their property that is "visible from a public
street or other public or private property"); see also, e.g., ATLANTA, GA., ORDINANCES Part LI,
ch. 74, art. V, § 74-174 (Supp. 2011); Bos., MASS., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. XVI, § 16-8.5
(2005); MIAMI, FLA., ORDINANCES Part II, ch. 37, §§ 37-2(f)-(g) (2007); SAN DIEGO, CAL.,
MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 5, art. 4, div. 4, §§ 54.0405(b)-54.0407 (2008).
59. See L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. IX, art. 1, § 91.8903.3.1.
60. Id. § 91.8903.2.1.
61. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, § 11.06, at 11-5 (5th ed. 2003). The
definition of a "sign" varies by municipality. As an example, land-use law scholar Daniel
Mandelker provides the following content-neutral definition: "A lettered, numbered, symbolic,
pictorial, or illuminated visual display designed to identify, announce, direct, or inform that is
visible from a public right-of-way." DANIEL R. MANDELKER & WILLIAM R. EWALD, STREET
GRAPHICS AND THE LAW 91 (rev. ed. 1988). Some cities have adopted Mandelker's exact defi-
nition as part of their sign codes. E.g., RANCHO VIEJO, TEX., ORDINANCES ch. 42, art. 1, § 42-4
(2007).
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story's height or twenty feet above curb level, whichever is lower.62 In
commercial districts, signs cannot exceed a specified surface area that varies
according to the district where the building is located.63
Los Angeles, in contrast to New York, imposes one of the most restric-
tive sign regulation schemes in the country,64 essentially prohibiting all
murals, even those commissioned by property owners.6 5 Unless a piece of
uncommissioned art contains writing, it would qualify as a mural sign66 and
would therefore be banned under the Los Angeles code. 67 Penalties for vio-
lating the code are severe. For each day a property owner is not in
compliance, he is subject to a $1,000 fine and up to six months of impris-
onment in county jail.68
II. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF UNCOMMISSIONED ART
A private property owner who wishes to preserve uncomnissioned art
may find that because the piece in question does not comply with applicable
sign regulations, or falls within the scope of a graffiti abatement ordinance,
city officials can mandate its removal. To protect his art, the property owner
can invoke the First Amendment and claim that land-use regulations requir-
ing abatement unconstitutionally abridge his free speech rights.69
This Part begins by examining several threshold issues for assessing the
constitutionality of the land-use regulations discussed in Section I.C. Sec-
tion II.A argues that the property and expressive rights in uncommissioned
art belong to the property owner. Section II.B posits that whether one classi-
fies graffiti as pure speech or symbolic speech, it deserves First Amendment
protection. Finally, Section II.C explains that graffiti does not per se fall into
speech categories that receive little or no First Amendment protection.
62. N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION art. I, ch. 2, § 22-342 (2011).
63. Id. art. Ill, ch. 2, § 32-642.
64. See Adolfo Guzman-Lopez, LA Proposes Lifting Mural Ban, S. CAL. PUB. RADIO,
Dec. 7, 2011, http://www.scpr.org/news/2011/12/07/30248la-proposes-fifting-artistic-mural-ban/
(noting that muralists fled Los Angeles due to the city's restrictive sign laws). In December
2011, the Los Angeles Department of City Planning proposed amending the city's sign code to
allow for the erection of murals, subject to approval via a permit process. Workshop & Public
Hearing Notice: The Mural Ordinance, L.A. DEP'T CITY PLAN.,
http://citypianning.lacity.org/Code -Studies/Misc/MuralOrdinance-DiscussionDrafLLADCP.p
df (last visited Feb. 29, 2012). Because uncommissioned art could never comply with a permit
scheme that requires approval as a precondition to display, however, it would not benefit from
Los Angeles's relaxed proposal.
65. See L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. I, art. 4.4, § 14.4.4(B)(10).
66. The Los Angeles code defines a mural sign as "[a] sign that is painted on or applied
to and made integral with a wall, the written message of which does not exceed three percent
of the total area of the sign." Id. § 14.4.2.
67. See id. § 14.4.4(B)(10).
68. L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. IX, art. 1, § 91.6201.5.
69. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment makes the First Amendment
applicable against the states. See, e.g., Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
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A. The Property Owner's Rights
The rights in uncommissioned art can be analyzed from two perspec-
tives. A property owner must not only own a piece physically; he must also
be able to ascribe the expressive quality of the work to himself such that any
proscription of the right to display it would violate the First Amendment.
This Section contends that both the property and expressive rights in un-
commissioned art belong to the property owner.
Graffiti falls within the scope of physical property rights belonging to
the property owner. This inference follows from the fact that a property
owner retains rights in whatever permanent structures are on his land7" as
well as fixtures attached to his property.7 Graffiti qualifies as a fixture be-
cause its firm attachment to a permanent structure on the land would make
separation of the two nearly impossible without damaging the structure or
undertaking a laborious excavation process.72 And the law is clear that when
trespassers, such as graffitists, place fixtures on property, the common law
grants the rights in those fixtures to the landowner.73
Not only does a landowner possess the property rights in uncommis-
sioned art, but he may also claim expressive rights in the piece. Courts have
not explicitly addressed whether a property owner who fortuitously encoun-
ters some form of expression on his property-such as uncommissioned
art-may invoke the First Amendment to protect that expression. Nonethe-
less, property owners in this scenario will easily meet the standing criteria to
bring a First Amendment challenge. Standing requires a plaintiff to "allege
[a] personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful
conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief."74 There is no
question that a plaintiff-property owner seeking to preserve uncommis-
sioned art would be personally injured by the land-use regulations described
in Section I.C, as these restrictions would deprive him of the art he wishes to
70. A permanent structure such as a house, garage, or other building falls within the
classic definition of real property, which includes "land, things therein, or annexed thereto,
[and] the space above the soil." FRANK HALL CHILDS, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY: CHATTELS AND CHOSES 2-4 (1914) (footnotes omitted).
71. According to the Uniform Commercial Code, "fixtures" are "goods that have be-
come so related to particular real property that an interest in them arises under real property
law." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(41) (amended 2010), 3 U.L.A. 58 (Supp. 2011).
72. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 24-5,
at 853 (5th ed. 2000). When determining whether goods are sufficiently related to realty to
achieve fixture status, courts consider the intention of the parties as "manifested by the firm-
ness with which the goods are affixed to the real estate and the amount of sweat that removal
would entail." Id. Removing graffiti from its permanent structure would entail considerable
"sweat." See, e.g., Mark Stryker, Graffiti Artist Banksy Leaves Mark on Detroit and
Ignites Firestorm, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 15, 2010, at Al, available at
http://www.freep.com/article/20100515/ENT05/100514007/graffiti-artist-banksy-leaves-mark-
detroit-ignites-firestorm (noting that heavy machinery was used to excavate a Banksy mural
from a cinderblock wall).
73. See Justice v. Nesquehoning Valley R.R., 87 Pa. 28, 31 (1878); CHILDS, supra note
70, at 27-29.
74. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
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keep. This injury would also be redressed were the ordinance held unconsti-
tutional as applied, since the property owner could then retain the artwork.
75
The property owner is in fact the only party who has standing to pursue
a First Amendment challenge in this scenario.76 This is true even though he
did not create the "speech" (artwork) since the law considers the property
owner, as art patron, the "speaker" in this context and thereby allows him to
assert a First Amendment violation. 71 In Burke v. City of Charleston, for
instance, the Fourth Circuit held that an artist commissioned to create an
exterior building mural lacked standing to pursue a First Amendment chal-
lenge against a historic preservation ordinance that required modification of
the mural.78 Only the building owner could bring the claim since it was his
speech being infringed;79 the artist, by contrast, had "relinquished his First
Amendment rights" when he sold the mural to the building owner.,, The
Burke court emphasized that the choice to express the message embodied in
the mural belonged solely to the building owner since ultimately he was the
one who decided whether to display the piece.
81
The primary difference between Burke and a case involving uncommis-
sioned art is that the transaction through which the property owner receives
the art in the latter scenario is not contractual, but is rather a legal conse-
quence of the graffitist's trespass.8 2 This distinction is inconsequential,
however, as the property owner in both scenarios is the party bearing the
harm of an ordinance threatening to remove or modify his First Amend-
ment-protected art. 3
B. Uncommissioned Art as Speech
This Section analyzes how uncommissioned art fits within the purview
of "speech" under the First Amendment. Expression must fall into one of
two rough categories to warrant First Amendment protection: "pure speech"
75. Given that most graffiti abatement ordinances empower city officials to forcibly
remove graffiti from private land, a property owner could also argue a takings violation under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This legal avenue is beyond the scope of this Note,
however.
76. The artist (graffitist) surrenders his First Amendment rights by trespassing on pri-
vate property because the First Amendment only governs speech restrained by state action; it
does not apply to restraints imposed by private actors. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551,567-68 (1972).
77. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 570 (1995) ("Nor, under our precedent, does First Amendment protection require a
speaker to generate, as an original matter, each item featured in the communication. Cable
operators, for example, are engaged in protected speech activities even when they only select
programming originally produced by others.").
78. 139 F.3d 401,405-06 (4th Cir. 1998).
79. Burke, 139 F.3d at 405.
80. Id. at 406.
81. Id. at 405-06.
82. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
83. See infra Section II.B.
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or "symbolic speech,"' the former receiving more protection than the lat-
ter. 5 Section II.B. 1 argues that uncommissioned art qualifies as pure speech.
Section lI.B.2 argues that, alternatively, uncommissioned art qualifies as
symbolic speech.
1. Pure Speech
Ideas expressed through the written or spoken word are considered pure
speech,86 a category entitled to presumptive First Amendment protection.87
What the pure speech category encompasses beyond verbal expression is
unclear, however.88 Graffiti writing is easily a form of pure speech that mer-
its First Amendment protection. Many uncommissioned artworks include no
writing, however, making classification of these pieces more difficult. This
Section contends that even nontextual graffiti qualifies as pure speech given
the broad protection bestowed on art in First Amendment jurisprudence.
Much case law and legal scholarship place the visual arts squarely with-
in the scope of expression entitled to presumptive First Amendment
protection.89 The apparent rationale for bestowing such strong speech pro-
tection on art is its power to transcend linguistic boundaries. 90 The Supreme
Court in Kaplan v. California, for instance, noted that "pictures, films, paint-
ings, drawings, and engravings . .. have First Amendment protection until
they collide with the long-settled position of this Court that obscenity is not
protected by the Constitution." 91 Similarly, the Second Circuit in Bery v.
City of New York explained that "paintings, photographs, prints and
84. "Symbolic speech" is also known as "expressive conduct'" E.g., I RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 11:7 (Supp. 1996).
85. Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment,
21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 31-32 (1973).
86. John P. Collins, Jr., Case Note, Speaking in Code, 106 YALE L.J. 2691, 2694
(1997).
87. E.g., Littlefield v. Fomey Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 296 (5th Cir. 2001);
Nimmer, supra note 85, at 31.
88. For instance, the Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District held that the wearing of black armbands by students to protest the Vietnam War was
"closely akin to 'pure speech'" and thus "entitled to comprehensive protection under the First
Amendment" even though the expression was not conveyed through the spoken or written
word. 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969).
89. See, e.g., White v. City of Sparks, 500 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he First
Amendment protects an artist's original paintings...."); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332
E3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The protection of the First Amendment ... includes ... music,
pictures, films, photographs, paintings, drawings, engravings, prints, and sculptures."); Bery v.
City of N.Y., 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Visual art is as wide ranging in its depiction of
ideas, concepts and emotions as any book, treatise, pamphlet or other writing, and is similarly
entitled to full First Amendment protection."); CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 10-1l (1995) ("[O]rdinary art ... [is] almost always protected [by
the First Amendment].... For constitutional purposes, most art is high-value.").
90. Bery, 97 F.3d at 695.
91. 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973) (emphasis added).
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sculptures ... always communicate some idea or concept to those who view
it, and as such are entitled to full First Amendment protection."92
Should a court determine that an uncommissioned artwork, even one
that does not contain text, warrants protection as pure speech, the analysis
would proceed directly to application of one of the tests discussed in Part III
to determine if the regulation requiring removal of the piece was constitu-
tional. Alternatively, if a court decided that the work was not a form of pure
speech, the analysis would turn to whether the piece qualified as symbolic
speech.
2. Symbolic Speech
Some courts might adhere to a literal interpretation of the pure speech
category-restricting it to verbal expression-and therefore require un-
commissioned artworks to meet the more burdensome symbolic speech93
standard. This Section demonstrates that uncommissioned art satisfies even
the most demanding version of the symbolic speech inquiry and thus merits
First Amendment protection.
The Supreme Court has "long recognized that [First Amendment] pro-
tection does not end at the spoken or written word," but rather extends to
other forms of expression, including symbolic speech.94 Among the symbol-
ic speech activities that have received First Amendment protection are the
wearing of armbands to protest the Vietnam War,95 flag burning,96 and nude
dancing.97 Not all conduct that is minimally expressive receives First
Amendment protection, however.9 The Court in Spence v. Washington de-
veloped a two-prong test for determining whether conduct is sufficiently
communicative to fall within the ambit of the First Amendment. 99 Under the
Spence test, there must first be "[a]n intent to convey a particularized mes-
sage" and second, a great likelihood "that the message would be understood
by those who viewed it.' 00
92. 97 F.3d at 696 (emphasis added).
93. Symbolic speech is conduct that has an expressive element. Nimmer, supra note 85,
at 36. The distinction between symbolic speech and pure speech is not clear, however, and
many scholars dispute the usefulness of the categories. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Comment,
Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1494 (1975) ("To some extent expression and
action are always mingled: most conduct includes elements of both. Even the clearest mani-
festations of expression involve some action, as in the case of... publishing a newspaper, or
merely talking." (quoting T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 80 (1970))).
94. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
95. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969).
96. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990).
97. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76 (1981).
98. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("We cannot accept the view
that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.").
99. 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per curiam).
100. Spence, 418 U.S. at410-11.
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Courts applying the Spence test have found art sufficiently communica-
tive to warrant First Amendment protection. In United States ex rel. Radich
v. Criminal Court of New York, for instance, a federal judge held that the
First Amendment protected a gallery owner's display of controversial sculp-
tures incorporating American flags meant to protest U.S. involvement in
Vietnam. 101 The court explained that the display satisfied the dual-factor
Spence test, focusing first on the American flag as a quintessential
expressive symbol, and second on the great likelihood that the message
would resonate with viewers since the timing of the display-during the
height of the Vietnam War-would have ineluctable significance. 2
The symbolic speech test established in Spence remained largely unchal-
lenged for more than twenty years,. until 1995 when the Court seemed to
liberalize the standard in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisex-
ual Group of Boston, Inc.03 Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court,
noted that "a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection," and that if protection were contingent on "expres-
sions conveying a 'particularized message,' [the First Amendment] would
never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music
of Arnold Schonberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.' '"" 4
Post-Hurley, most circuit courts have expanded the range of expression
that qualifies as symbolic speech. 5 For instance, in Mastrovincenzo v. City
of New York, the Second Circuit held that clothing reminiscent of graffiti
was sufficiently communicative to merit First Amendment protection.' 06 The
court disregarded Spence's "particularized message" requirement and in-
stead held that the clothing was protected because it had a "predominantly
101. 385 F. Supp. 165, 168-69, 174-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
102. Radich, 385 F. Supp. at 174-75.
103. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
104. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (citation omitted). Most courts have interpreted this state-
ment to signify the breadth of First Amendment protection. See infra note 105 and
accompanying text. One court, however, understood the Hurley quotation to mean that the
First Amendment protects only "great works of art." Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597
F.3d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 2010). The Supreme Court declined to resolve what now appears to be
a circuit split on the issue. Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 131 S. Ct. 159 (2010) (denying
certiorari). This Note assumes the Fifth Circuit's narrow interpretation is incorrect, as have the
majority of circuit courts. See, e.g., Mastrovincenzo v. City of N.Y., 435 F.3d 78, 97 (2d Cir.
2006) (rejecting test that considers "'bona fides as an artist' in determining whether an item is
expressive"); supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text; infra note 105 and accompanying
text.
105. See, e.g., Condon v. Wolfe, 310 F. App'x 807, 819 (6th Cir. 2009); White v. City of
Sparks, 500 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2007); Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d
1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004); Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 319 (2d Cit. 2003);
Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 159-60 (3d Cir. 2002). But see Lit-
tlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275,296 (5th Cir. 2001) (retaining Spence test for
determining whether conduct is expressive).
106. 435 E3d at 81-82, 96.
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expressive purpose."10 Like the graffiti in Mastrovincenzo, uncommissioned
art is sufficiently expressive to qualify as symbolic speech." 8
Even when analyzed only under the Court's articulation of the symbolic
speech standard-the Spence test viewed in light of Hurley-rather than any
particular circuit's post-Hurley interpretation, uncommissioned art is still
sufficiently expressive to warrant First Amendment protection. By declaring
that the First Amendment indisputably protects a Jackson Pollock painting,
the Court implied that a similarly abstract work would be sufficiently ex-
pressive to satisfy the Spence inquiry. 0 9 Uncommissioned art is no more
abstract in meaning than a Pollock painting, and thus deserves protection
per the Hurley Court's reasoning.
C. Uncommissioned Art Distinguished from Unprotected
and Low- Value Speech
Further justification for granting First Amendment protection to un-
commissioned art stems from the fact that it does not per se fall into
categories of expression that receive limited or no speech protection. Graffiti
is not an inherently sexually explicit medium and therefore is not a form of
obscenity"1 0 or child pornography,"' types of speech that receive no protec-
tion. Uncommissioned art is also unlike expression that incites illegal
activity, a form of low-value speech that receives limited First Amendment
protection. 1 2
Speech must meet the two-prong Brandenburg test to be proscribed on
the basis of incitement.113 This requires that the speech is both "directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and "likely to incite or pro-
duce such action."'"1 4 The Court has imposed a high threshold for the
imminence requirement. For instance, in Hess v. Indiana, the Court held that
the First Amendment protected a protester's statement "We'll take the fuck-
ing street later" during an antiwar rally." 5 The Court reasoned that the
speech was insufficient to meet the Brandenburg test because it was "not
directed to any person or group of persons," and there was no evidence that
the protester's "words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, im-
minent disorder."' 16
107. Mastrovincenzo, 435 E3d at 96.
108. See id.
109. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.
110. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
111. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982).
112. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 195 (1983).
113. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
114. Id.
115. 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973) (per curiam).
116. Hess, 414 U.S. at 108-09.
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Despite municipalities' contentions to the contrary, graffiti, as a genre, is
not inherently dangerous enough to meet the Brandenburg standard. Cities
often claim that graffiti perpetuates violence and stimulates gang activity." 7
Dubbed the "broken windows theory" in the 1980s, this hypothesis assumes
that areas rife with indicia of urban disorder-shattered windows or prolific
graffiti, for instance-invite crime by suggesting that no one cares to main-
tain order in those areas. 18 In truth, the connection between graffiti and
crime is specious. 119 One study analyzing the relationship suggests that
neighborhoods with more graffiti actually experience fewer instances of
crime. 20 Moreover, one federal district court has already ruled that graffiti is
not inherently threatening enough to meet the Brandenburg standard. In
Ecko.Complex LLC v. Bloomberg, the plaintiff sought a permit to host an
outdoor exhibition where artists would paint graffiti on "mock, two-
dimensional subway cars."' 2' After initially granting the request, the city
later revoked the permit out of concern that the plaintiff's proposed display
would incite illegal activity. 122 The court roundly condemned the city's
"heavy-handed censorship" and held that denying a permit on these grounds
was "a flagrant violation of the First Amendment" under the Brandenburg
standard.1
23
At least in the abstract, graffiti not only fails to give rise to an actionable
Brandenburg claim for inciting criminal activity, but it also does not inevi-
tably fall into speech categories the Court affords no First Amendment
protection. That is, the existence of these categories-obscenity, child por-
nography, and incitement of illegal activity-is not an automatic bar to
uncommissioned art receiving First Amendment protection; a case-by-case
analysis to determine whether a particular piece should be classified as low-
value or unprotected speech is therefore still necessary.
117. See, e.g., L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.1(C) (2010) ("[T]he
spread of graffiti often leads to violence, genuine threats to life, and the perpetuation of gangs,
gang violence, and gang territories.").
118. See SNYDER, supra note 14, at 48.
119. See, e.g., Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 857 F Supp. 1355, 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1994) ("Gang graffiti accounts for approximately 10% of the graffiti in San Fran-
cisco...."); Alan Citron, No Longer a Gang Monopoly: Upscale Youths Making Own Marks
with Graffiti, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1988, at I ("While graffiti inspires a special fear in Los
Angeles because it is usually associated with gangs, authorities said that as much as half of the
public scrawling in many parts of the city is not the handiwork of the Bloods or Crips, but of
gentrified vandals .... ").
120. The study compared SoHo, New York and Prospect Heights, New York. In 2006,
SoHo had considerably more graffiti than Prospect Heights, but reported no murders and far
fewer instances of other crimes. SNYDER, supra note 14, at 50-51. That same year, Prospect
Heights reported three murders and nearly four times as many robberies and acts of felonious
assault as SoHo. Id.
121. 382 F. Supp. 2d 627, 628-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
122. Ecko.Complex LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 628.
123. Id. at 629-30.
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III. ARGUING FOR THE TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER TEST
If a court determines that uncommissioned art warrants First Amend-
ment speech protection-as this Note argues it should-it must next assess
the constitutionality of ordinances restricting that speech. This Part advo-
cates applying the time, place, and manner test to evaluate the
constitutionality of ordinances that would require removal of uncommis-
sioned art.
Perhaps the most important metric guiding the selection of a First
Amendment test is whether the regulation challenged is content based or
content neutral. A content-based ordinance is one that discriminates accord-
ing to message, idea, or subject matter. 124 By contrast, a regulation is content
neutral "so long as it is 'justified without reference to the content, of the reg-
ulated speech.' ",125 A content-based ordinance must survive strict scrutiny
review, meaning it will only be held constitutional if it is narrowly drawn to
achieve a compelling state interest. 126 A content-neutral ordinance must
withstand intermediate scrutiny review, meaning it will only be held consti-
tutional if it is substantially related to an important governmental interest. 127
Both graffiti abatement ordinances and sign regulations are likely con-
tent neutral. Graffiti abatement ordinances apply to all markings made
without advance authorization from the property owner; whether they apply
does not depend on the message conveyed by the graffiti. 28 Sign regulations
will also be presumed content neutral for purposes of this Note, as limita-
tions on signs' size, shape, and location do not constrain a message's subject
matter or viewpoint. 129
As long as ordinances are content neutral, they may limit the time,
place, and manner of speech. 30 This Note therefore argues that the time,
place, and manner test is appropriate for assessing the constitutionality of
graffiti abatement ordinances and sign regulations. Under this test, ordi-
nances are valid as long as they (1) "are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech," (2) "serve a significant governmental inter-
124. SMOLLA, supra note 84, § 3:9 (Supp. 2012); see also Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
125. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty.
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)); see also id. ("The principal inquiry in
determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases
in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disa-
greement with the message it conveys.").
126. See, e.g., Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987). Some
formulations of the strict scrutiny standard demand that the regulation be the "least restrictive
means" of achieving a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v.
FCC, 492 U.S. 115,126 (1989).
127. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) (plurality
opinion).
128. See, e.g., L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.2(E) (2010).
129. See, e.g., BRIAN J, CONNOLLY & MARK A. WYCKOFF, MICHIGAN SIGN GUIDEBOOK:
THE LOCAL PLANNING & REGULATION OF SIGNS 6-3 (2011).
130. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
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est," (3) are "narrowly tailored to serve [that] interest," and (4) "leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information."'' Alter-
native channels are especially important in the context of uncommissioned
art, as explained more fully in Section IV.B.
One potential counterargument against selecting the time, place, and
manner test is that the Court formulated the inquiry for application to public
forums, not private property. This argument holds little weight, however,
since the Court has invoked the time, place, and manner test multiple times
in the private context. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., for in-
stance, the Court applied the test to an ordinance regulating private
commercial property.132 It applied the test again in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, to
an ordinance regulating yard signs on private residential property.'33
Also potentially weighing against selection of the time, place, and man-
ner test is that the Court sometimes evaluates content-neutral restrictions on
speech under the framework established in United States v. O'Brien, an in-
quiry nearly identical to the time, place, and manner test except that it
contains no alternative channels component. 3 4 There is considerable confu-
sion about what type of speech restrictions call for application of the
O'Brien test rather than the time, place, and manner test. Some commenta-
tors understand O'Brien to apply only to cases involving symbolic
speech 135-not an unreasonable understanding given that O'Brien itself was
a symbolic speech case and the Court's post-O'Brien discussion of First
Amendment tests has been somewhat convoluted.'3 6 This interpretation is
not entirely convincing, however, because the Court has applied the time,
place, and manner test even to cases involving pure speech. 137 Other schol-
ars argue that O'Brien is the standard for all cases involving content-neutral
restraints on speech-whether pure or symbolic. 38 This interpretation, how-
ever, fails to account for those cases involving content-neutral restrictions
where the Court has applied the time, place, and manner test rather than
O'Brien.3 9 Nonetheless, the practical effect of the two tests is so similar that
any confusion is immaterial for purposes of this Note.
131. Id.
132. 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986). The Court also applied the time, place, and manner test to a
regulation prohibiting live nude dancing at a private commercial venue in Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-76 (1981).
133. 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994).
134. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Under the O'Brien test, a content-neutral restriction on
speech is constitutional if it "furthers an important or substantial governmental interest ...
[that] is unrelated to the suppression of free expression" and is "no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest." Id.
135. See, e.g., Ryan J. Walsh, Comment, Painting on a Canvas of Skin: Tattooing and the
First Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REv. 1063, 1068 (2011).
136. See SMOLLA, supra note 84.
137. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
138. E.g., SMOLLA, supra note 84.
139. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
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Although the O'Brien test has no formal alternative channels provision,
this has not deterred the Court from stressing the importance of alternative
outlets for expression in cases involving content-neutral restrictions on
speech. Justice Harlan, concurring in O'Brien, expressed his concern that
some statutes might satisfy the test outlined by the majority but nonetheless
leave a speaker insufficient avenues for expressing his views:
I wish to make explicit my understanding that [the Court's test] does not
foreclose consideration of First Amendment claims in those rare instances
when an "incidental" restriction upon expression, imposed by a regulation
which furthers an "important or substantial" governmental interest and sat-
isfies the Court's other criteria, in practice has the effect of entirely
preventing a "speaker" from reaching a significant audience with whom he
could not otherwise lawfully communicate.'4
The time, place, and manner test addresses Justice Harlan's concern by
incorporating the alternative channels prong, and the test has been applied
post-O'Brien to content-neutral restrictions on speech, including those that
regulate symbolic speech. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence
demonstrates this point well. Although the conduct at issue in Clark-
sleeping in tents to "demonstrat[e] the plight of the homeless"-was
undoubtedly symbolic speech, the Court analyzed the content-neutral regu-
lation banning camping in a public park as a time, place, and manner
restriction rather than applying the O'Brien test, and assessed whether there
were ample alternatives for the plaintiffs' expression. 4 '
Even in cases where the Court purports to strictly apply the test outlined
in O'Brien, alternative channels still inform the Court's analysis. In Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., for instance, the Court applied the O'Brien test to de-
termine whether an Indiana statute prohibiting public nudity violated the
First Amendment rights of adult entertainment venue operators wishing to
offer nude dancing. 142 Despite invoking the O'Brien test, the Court noted the
presence of alternative channels in holding that the ordinance was constitu-
tional. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality, indicated that the
statute still allowed for expression of an erotic message since it only pro-
scribed full nudity, yet permitted sexually suggestive dancing as long as
performers wore some minimal amount of clothing.1
4 1
The alternative channels component of the time, place, and manner test
is what distinguishes it from other forms of intermediate scrutiny. Because
this test has been applied to content-neutral regulations restraining both pure
140. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); see
also SMOLLA, supra note 84, § 9:17 (Supp. 2010) (arguing that "it is a fair reading of O'Brien
that government regulations which effectively choke off expression" do not satisfy the
O'Brien test).
141. Clark, 468 U.S. at 290-94.
142. 501 U.S. 560, 561,566 (1991) (plurality opinion).
143. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571 ("[T]he requirement that the dancers don pasties and G-
strings does not deprive the dance of whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply makes the
message slightly less graphic.").
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speech and symbolic speech, and to land-use restrictions affecting private
property, it is the appropriate inquiry for evaluating the constitutionality of
ordinances regulating uncommissioned art.
IV. APPLYING THE TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER TEST
This Part analyzes how a court might apply the time, place, and manner
test to land-use regulations that require the removal of uncommissioned art.
Section IV.A examines the first three prongs of the test, which would likely
weigh in a city's favor. As argued in Section IV.B, however, because there
would be insufficient alternative channels for a property owner to express
himself, these ordinances, as applied, would nonetheless be unconstitution-
al. Lastly, Section IV.C describes an additional justification for protecting
uncommissioned art under the First Amendment: the presumptive protection
afforded expression occurring on a speaker's own property.
A. Content Neutrality, Substantial Governmental Interest,
and Narrow Tailoring
As discussed in Part III, both graffiti abatement ordinances and sign reg-
ulations are likely content neutral and therefore satisfy the first prong of the
time, place, and manner analysis. Similarly, both graffiti abatement ordi-
nances and sign regulations likely serve a substantial governmental
interest,'" the second factor in the time, place, and manner test. Promoting
community aesthetics, curbing crime and urban blight, and maintaining
property values-the aims of graffiti abatement ordinances-are significant
governmental interests.1 45 Sign regulations promote traffic safety and help
create an aesthetically desirable environment, which are also substantial
governmental interests. 146
Narrow tailoring, the third prong of the time, place, and manner test, al-
so likely favors municipalities over property owners. An ordinance meets
the narrow tailoring requirement so long as it "promotes a substantial gov-
ernment interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation."1 47 Content-neutral regulations of signs on private property are
typically narrowly tailored since aesthetic objectives would be achieved less
effectively without limitations on the size and location of signs.' The nar-
row tailoring rationale for graffiti abatement ordinances is less clear,
144. The Court seems to use the descriptors "substantial," "significant," and "important"
interchangeably. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567 ("important or substantial governmental inter-
est" (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Clark, 468 U.S.
at 293 ("significant governmental interest").
145. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,48, 50 (1986).
146. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-08 (1981)
(plurality opinion).
147. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985).
148. See, e.g., Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 808-10, 816-17 (1984); Riel v. City of Bradford, 485 F.3d 736, 747, 751 (3d Cir. 2007).
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however. Although limitations on the display of graffiti could be rationalized
by aesthetic interests, similar to the way sign regulations are justified, this
does not necessarily provide a convincing rationale for the complete abate-
ment of graffiti, as is often required by nuisance ordinances. Municipalities
sometimes justify abatement ordinances by citing graffiti's effect on crime,
but that link is tenuous. 4 9 Nonetheless, the Court seems satisfied that the
narrow tailoring requirement is met even by minimal proof showing that a
municipal objective would be thwarted without a particular regulation. 150
Therefore, this Note assumes, without concluding, that graffiti abatement
ordinances would meet the third prong of the time, place, and manner test.
B. Alternative Channels
Although the first three prongs of the time, place, and manner test likely
favor municipalities, the alternative channels component shifts the analysis
in favor of property owners, and serves as the basis for finding graffiti
abatement ordinances and sign regulations unconstitutional as applied under
the First Amendment. The alternative channels provision ensures that speak-
ers can still communicate a First Amendment-protected message in some
way despite the limitations imposed by a time, place, and manner re-
striction. Not only must a court consider whether alternative channels exist,
but it must also weigh whether the available alternatives are "ample" for
conveying the desired message"'5-an inquiry assessed from the speaker's
point of view.'52 Alternatives are not ample "if the intended message is ren-
dered useless or is seriously burdened.""'
This Section discusses two categories of alternatives that are insufficient
to satisfy the final prong of the time, place, and manner test as applied to
uncommissioned art: those that prevent the speaker from reaching a public
audience and those that are prohibitively expensive. Section IV.B.1 contends
that graffiti abatement ordinances and sign regulations violate the First
Amendment when they preclude uncommissioned art from being displayed
publicly. Section IV.B.2 argues that any alternatives to a property owner
retaining uncommissioned art in the location where it was created are too
expensive to be considered "ample." Finally, Section IV.B.3 explains why
alternative channels are particularly important in an as-applied constitution-
al challenge, the type of challenge property owners seeking to preserve
uncommissioned art would bring.
149. See supra Section H.C.
150. See, e.g., Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52 ("The First Amendment does not require a city,
before enacting ... an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of
that already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is
reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.").
151. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
152. Weinberg v. City of Chi., 310 F.3d 1029, 1041 (7th Cir. 2002).
153. Id.; see also, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56-57 (1994).
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1. Public Visibility and Message Moderation
One of the central tenets of First Amendment jurisprudence is that
speakers have a right to reach the public with their message. 154 Although the
Court tolerates alteration of the medium through which a speaker conveys
his message, as well as some dilution of a speaker's desired message, an
ordinance that completely forecloses a speaker from reaching a public audi-
ence leaves insufficient alternative channels for communication and is thus
unconstitutional.
The Court has routinely struck down regulations that prohibit speech ac-
tivities when there are insufficient alternative media to communicate the
speaker's desired message. In City of Ladue v. Gilleo, for instance, the Court
held unconstitutional an ordinance that banned almost all signs on both pub-
lic and private property, including the display of a political sign in a
homeowner's window.155 Similarly, the Court has struck down ordinances
that completely banned the distribution of pamphlets, 56 door-to-door dissem-
ination of literature, 157 and non-obscene nude dancing 58  since they
"foreclose[d] an entire medium of expression." '159
By contrast, ordinances that regulate speech but leave the speaker other
media to convey his message are constitutional. In Frisby v. Schultz, for in-
stance, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting residential picketing
against a challenge brought by abortion protesters. 60 The Court reasoned
that protesters could still convey their message by distributing literature,
knocking on doors, and telephoning residents in the community, and thus
the ordinance left open ample alternatives for communication.'
6
'
Unlike the speech at issue in Frisby, however, the expressive value of art
inheres in the medium through which the message is conveyed. The two are
inextricably tied. As a result, alternatives available in other contexts 162 are
154. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam) (noting that the First
Amendment is "designed 'to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources'" (quoting N.Y Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266
(1964))); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943) ("Freedom to distribute
information to every citizen ... is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that,
putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it
must be fully preserved."); Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1049 (9th Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (explaining that "an alternative is not ample if the speaker is not permitted to reach the
intended audience" (quoting Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 522
F.3d 1010, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008), amended by 574 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2008))).
155. 512 U.S. at 46, 54, 59.
156. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938).
157. Martin, 319 U.S. at 145-49.
158. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-77 (1981).
159. See Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 55.
160. 487 U.S. 474,476-77, 488 (1988).
161. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484.
162. For instance, a speaker can express the same political message through multiple
different media by posting lawn signs, distributing pamphlets, or communicating the message
directly to individuals through door-to-door transmission.
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not available for art. This fact weighs against the constitutionality of regula-
tions requiring uncommissioned art's removal.
Whether alternative media exist for conveying a speaker's message does
not end the analysis, however, as ordinances that merely moderate the po-
tency of a speaker's message without completely foreclosing the opportunity
to speak are constitutional. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., for instance, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance banning public nudity
against a challenge brought by adult entertainment venue operators and per-
formers.163 The Court reasoned that the ordinance did not prevent dancers
from conveying a sexually suggestive message since they could still dance
in a provocative manner; they merely were precluded from doing so while
completely nude.' 64 Similarly, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court
found that an ordinance limiting the volume at which concert promoters
could host a show in Central Park did not violate the First Amendment be-
cause the promoters could still host musical performances, albeit at a
slightly reduced volume. 165
Although Barnes and Ward illustrate that alternatives diluting a speak-
er's message can be "ample" and thereby defeat a finding that an ordinance
is unconstitutional, uncommissioned art does not lend itself to message
moderation. As compared to the erotic dance at issue in Barnes, which could
be performed in a slightly less prurient manner,166 and the music at issue in
Ward, which could be played at a reduced volume, 67 uncommissioned art
cannot exist in a diluted form. Art's existence is binary. Any regulation that
requires the removal of uncommissioned art does not simply weaken the
potency of the work's message; it completely forecloses the opportunity for
the work to be displayed publicly, and therefore cannot be constitutional
when applied to a property owner who wishes to preserve the work.
Indeed, circuit courts applying the time, place, and manner test have
routinely held that regulations prohibiting artists and performers from reach-
ing a public audience violate the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit in
Berger v. City of Seattle, for instance, considered an ordinance relegating
street performers to sixteen locations in an eighty-acre public park. 68 The
court held that the summary judgment was inappropriate and remanded for
trial, noting that the evidence was "sufficient to support a reasonable infer-
ence that the designated locations [did] not provide access to [the street
performer's] intended audience."'' 69
Similarly, in Bery v. City of New York, the Second Circuit held that an
ordinance prohibiting painters, photographers, and sculptors from selling
their artwork on public streets without a vendor's license violated the First
163. 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (plurality opinion).
164. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571.
165. 491 U.S. 781, 802-03 (1989).
166. See supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text.
167. Ward, 491 U.S. at 802.
168. 569 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
169. Berger, 569 F.3d at 1050.
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Amendment. 170 Rejecting the city's contention that alternative avenues of
expression existed because the artists could sell their work from home, in
galleries, or through street fairs, the court explained that these channels were
inadequate because artists were "entitled to a public forum" for their expres-
sion:
Displaying art on the street has a different expressive purpose than gallery
or museum shows; it reaches people who might not choose to go into a
gallery or museum or who might feel excluded or alienated from these fo-
rums. The public display and sale of artwork is a form of communication
between the artist and the public not possible in the enclosed, separated
spaces of galleries and museums. 7'
The Bery court concluded that because the vending ordinance left the artists
insufficient alternative channels for expression, it violated their First
Amendment rights. 172
In Gilleo, the Court affirmed that speakers have the right to transmit
their message to a public audience even when speaking from their own
property. Striking down a comprehensive sign ban, the Court explained that
"[d]isplaying a sign from one's own residence often carries a message quite
distinct from placing the same sign someplace else .... Precisely because
of their location, such signs provide information about the identity of the
'speaker.' "173 Thus, foreclosing a speaker's unique opportunity to reach the
public by displaying a sign on his property would violate the First Amend-
ment.
One recent Fifth Circuit decision conflicts with the Gilleo holding. In
Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, the plaintiff, Kleinman, challenged a San
Marcos, Texas, ordinance preventing him from displaying a "car-planter" in
front of his novelty store. 7 4 San Marcos officials charged Kleinman with
violating a city ordinance that banned citizens from keeping junked vehicles
on their property. 75 The Fifth Circuit held that the regulation did not violate
170. 97 F.3d 689, 691-92, 698 (2d Cir. 1996).
171. Bery, 97 F.3d at 698 (second emphasis added).
172. Id.; cf Travis v. Park City Mun. Corp., 565 F3d 1252, 1257 (10th Cir. 2009) (not-
ing that an ordinance prohibiting an artist from displaying and selling his artwork on public
property without a permit left open ample alternatives because "[n]othing in the sales ordi-
nance prohibit[ed] the sale of art on private property or the ability of artists to display their art
in other public parks").
173. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994) (second emphasis added).
174. 597 F.3d 323, 324 (5th Cir. 2010). Community members created the planter by
removing an old vehicle's roof, tires, and engine, and filling the car with soil, in which they
planted cacti and other vegetation. Aimee Villalobos, Planet K Car Planter Still Under
Debate, U. STAR (San Marcos, Tex.), Mar. 4, 2010, http://star.txstate.edu/content/planet-k-car-
planter-still-under-debate. Artists painted the exterior of the vehicle with peace signs and other
graphics. Kleinman, 597 F3d at 324-25. For photographs of the car-planter, see Brad Rollins,
Federal Judge Says Car Planter Not Protected by First Amendment, SAN MARCOS MERCURY
(Tex.), Mar. 11, 2008, http://smmercury.com/33705/federal-judge-says-car-planter-not-protected-
by-first-amendment/.
175. Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 325.
November 2012]
Michigan Law Review
Kleinman's First Amendment rights,17 6 as it left ample alternatives for ex-
pression.177 In an argument that can at best be described as illogical, the
court posited that "enclosing the car-planter [did] not cut off public access
because it le[ft the property owner] free to display the car-planter behind a
fence, indoors, or in a garage enclosure." 17 8 Kleinman, the court insisted,
could still encourage the public to view the planter by, for instance,
"erect[ing] a sign or display[ing] a poster of the car-planter visible to the
public. 179
This Note argues that the Kleinman decision is in error. The notion that a
two-dimensional photograph or poster of an original artwork is capable of
communicating the work's expressive value is dubious. Would such a flat
representation adequately convey the kinetic intrigue of a three-dimensional
Alexander Calder mobile or the layered, pooled paint drips of a Jackson
Pollock painting? If so, there would be no need for museums-all art's ex-
pressiveness could be absorbed simply by viewing images on the internet. It
is also untenable to suggest that a work is accessible to the public when hid-
den behind a fence or confined to a private indoor structure. Kleinman
simply does not comport with the Gilleo, Bery, and Berger holdings that a
speaker is entitled to communicate his message to a public audience.
Additionally, removing uncommissioned art from its original location
would destroy that significant component of the work's message derived
from the site where it was created. One particularly poignant example is
Banksy's 2010 mural Trees, which he stenciled on the site of Detroit's now
defunct Packard automotive plant. 180 Since the plant closed in 1956, the 3.5
million-square-foot complex has become a veritable ruin, filled with crum-
bling bricks and shattered windows. 181 Banksy's mural, stenciled on a
cinderblock wall amid the rubble, depicted a young boy looking out at his
surroundings while holding a paintbrush and paint can; stenciled beside him
were the words "I remember when all this was trees."'8 2 Shortly after
Banksy created the piece, owners of a Detroit art gallery entered the proper-
ty with heavy machinery and removed the cinderblock containing the
mural. 183 The gallery owners intended to preserve the mural for display in
176. The court first concluded that the car-planter was not sufficiently expressive to
warrant speech protection, id. at 327, a finding this Note has already criticized, see supra note
104. Nonetheless, "[in an abundance of caution," the court applied an intermediate scrutiny
test, noting that the car-planter might have some expressive value. Kleinman, 597 E3d at 328.
177. Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 329.
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. See Matthew Dolan, If You Take Street Art off the Street, Is It Still Art?, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 9, 2011, at Al.
181. Id.
182. Id. For photographs of the mural, see Saving BANKSY, DETROITFUNK, May, 11,
2010, http://www.detroitfunk.coml?p=4407.
183. Dolan, supra note 180. The Packard plant owner later sued the gallery, claiming
that he had not given the gallery owners permission to remove the mural. Mark Stryker, 555
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their gallery. Though reasonable from a legal perspective-the work would
otherwise have been subject to abatement under Detroit's graffiti removal
ordinance'14-the move, to many, was inexcusable from an art perspective.
Some art critics insisted that the work's message was site-specific and had
been destroyed when the mural was relocated. 85 Indeed, the work will now
be confined to an indoor gallery1 86 and will almost certainly attract a differ-
ent type of viewer than had it remained on the Packard plant site.
Not only does First Amendment jurisprudence consider public visibility
valuable to the speaker communicating a message, but it also finds such
visibility valuable to the audience receiving the message. The Court has
explained that the "protection given speech and press was fashioned to as-
sure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people."'187 This "marketplace of ideas" ra-
tionale' is served by forcing viewers of uncommissioned art to confront
assumptions about daily life, consider unfamiliar political viewpoints, and
contemplate social ideas they may find unpalatable. For instance, when
Banksy's stenciled image of two male police officers kissing was removed
from its original site on the streets of Brighton, England, and transferred to
canvas,189 one commentator explained that the move had serious ramifica-
tions for the gay community:
Stenciled on the wall of a pub, the original piece was situated in the street,
where it could confront a homophobic audience daily. The work's location
and context normalized homosexuality, allowing it to gain in visibility and
acceptance. But, when a work like this is taken from the street and slapped
on a canvas, it becomes separated from any real, lived experience and rele-
gated to the realm of high art. Moreover, its audience becomes much
smaller and more homogenous."9
Among the bedrock principles of the First Amendment is that speakers
have the right to convey their message to a public audience. Ordinances that
require property owners to remove or shield uncommissioned art from exte-
rior view violate this fundamental right of speakers by leaving property
owners insufficient alternative channels to communicate their message.
Gallery Gets OK to Display Banksy Mural, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 11, 2011, at F6. The
parties settled for $2,500, with the gallery receiving title to the mural. Id.
184. See DETROIT, MICH., CODE pt. III, ch. 9, art. I, div. 4, subdiv. A, pt. I, § 9-1-111
(Supp. 2011).
185. See Dolan, supra note 180.
186. See Stryker, supra note 183.
187. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
188. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Abrams v. United States, is credited with the "market-
place of ideas" concept. See 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (referring to
"free trade in ideas").
189. Alexandra Topping, Brighton Kisses Goodbye to Banksy's Kissing Coppers, THE
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 22, 2011, at 8, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/
201 1/apr/21/banksy-kissing-coppers-sold-america. For a photograph of the place, see id.
190. Emily Greenberg, Interfering with Banksy, CORNELL DAILY SUN, Apr. 26, 2011,
http://comellsun.com/node/47027.
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2. Expense
In addition to denying speakers the opportunity to reach a public audi-
ence with their message, other alternatives the Court deems insufficient to
satisfy the time, place, and manner test are those requiring the speaker to
incur considerable expense. In Martin v. City of Struthers, for instance, the
Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited door-to-door pamphlet dis-
tributors from ringing doorbells and knocking on doors. 19 ' The Court
reasoned that the ordinance eliminated an inexpensive medium for dissemi-
nating ideas, which was crucial to those without the resources to publicize
their message in more extravagant ways. 192 Similarly, in Linmark Associates,
Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, the Court invalidated an ordinance that pro-
hibited the posting of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs, reasoning that the
"options to which sellers realistically [were] relegated[,] primarily newspa-
per advertising and listing [properties] with real estate agents[,] involve[d]
more cost and less autonomy than 'For Sale' signs."' 193
Because a property owner receives uncommissioned art at no cost, any
alternative to retaining the piece in its original location would not be ample
unless it required minimal additional expenditure by the property owner.194
The cost of relocating a work of uncommissioned art would vary on a case-
by-case basis, but some methods of preservation can be exorbitant. One
example is telling. In 2008, the buyer of a garage containing a Banksy mural
spent £30,000195 to have the piece "'peeled' from the wall" and chemically
transferred to canvas, a process that took an art restorer six weeks to com-
plete. 196 Paying to transfer the mural in that instance made sense,
considering it was worth an estimated 300,000.97 Unlike a Banksy mural,
however, most uncommissioned art has little extrinsic value, and requiring a
property owner to undertake such a costly endeavor can hardly be deemed
an ample alternative. Other methods of preservation, such as removing the
portion of the physical structure containing the art, as the Detroit gallery
191. 319 U.S. 141,142,149 (1943).
192. Martin, 319 U.S. at 146 ("Door to door distribution of circulars is essential to the
poorly financed causes of little people.").
193. 431 U.S. 85, 86, 93, 98 (1977).
194. The Court's jurisprudence focuses on comparative, rather than absolute, cost. Thus,
a possible alternative fails to be "ample" when the cost of communicating through that chan-
nel greatly exceeds the cost of communicating through the channel foreclosed by the
ordinance. See, e.g., Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93; Martin, 319 U.S. at 146.
195. On March 4, 2008, the day the press published this story, £30,000 was equivalent to
$59,548.50 in U.S. dollars. Currency Converter, OANDA, http://www.oanda.concurrency/
converter/ (select "British Pound"; select "US Dollar"; select "Mar. 4, 2008"; and enter
"30,000") (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
196. Elizabeth Hopkirk, £1,000 Banksy Taken off Wall by German Now Worth £300,000,
EVENING STANDARD (London), Mar. 4, 2008, at A25.
197. Hopkirk, supra note 196. On March 4, 2008, £300,000 was equivalent to $595,485
in U.S. dollars. OANDA, supra note 196 (select "British Pound"; select "US Dollar"; select
"Mar. 4, 2008"; and enter "300,000").
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owners did with Banksy's Trees mural, 98 are likely less expensive, but again
cannot be considered legitimate alternatives when they require destroying a
portion of the property owner's building. Such a move would sometimes be
physically impossible as well since some works may be too large to place
indoors or hide completely from public view.
3. Alternative Channels in the As-Applied Analysis
Expense and opportunity to reach a public audience are among the fac-
tors courts consider in assessing whether sufficient alternative channels exist
for a speaker to convey his message. Nonetheless, in many of the cases de-
scribed previously in this Part where courts have found a First Amendment
violation, it is narrow tailoring and not alternative channels that serves as the
basis for holding the law unconstitutional. 199
In as-applied constitutional challenges-the type property owners seek-
ing to preserve uncommissioned art would assert-however, the alternative
channels component does substantively affect the time, place, and manner
analysis. In Executive Arts Studio, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, for example,
the Sixth Circuit held a Grand Rapids, Michigan, ordinance restricting
where an adult bookstore could locate unconstitutional, both facially and as
applied to the plaintiff, Executive Arts Studio. 200 Notably, the court ex-
plained that even if the ordinance were narrowly tailored, it would still
violate the plaintiff's First Amendment rights because it foreclosed "Execu-
tive Arts ... from opening its store in all but around a half dozen possible
sites in a City with over 2,500 parcels of commercially useable real estate,"
which, the court held, was "wholly inadequate to provide for reasonable
alternative avenues of communication. 2 0 ' The court distinguished the case
from City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., in which the Court upheld a
similar ordinance,20 2 noting that in the City of Renton, unlike in Grand Rap-
ids, there were more than 500 acres of land available to operate the adult
business 203
The argument discussed in this Note assumes an as-applied, rather than
facial, constitutional challenge. Facially, content-neutral graffiti abatement
ordinances and sign regulations likely leave sufficient alternative channels
for expression. It is only when a property owner expresses a desire to keep
graffiti on his property that these regulations abridge his First Amendment
rights. For instance, where a property owner commissions an artist to paint
an outdoor mural on his property, requiring compliance with a content-neutral
198. See supra text accompanying notes 180-186.
199. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54-55 (1994).
200. 391 F3d 783, 786-87, 796-98 (6th Cir. 2004).
201. Executive Arts Studio, 391 E3d at 797.
202. 475 U.S. 41, 43, 54-55 (1986).
203. Executive Arts Studio, 391 F3d at 797.
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sign regulation likely poses no constitutional problem. 204 The property owner
in this scenario can investigate the applicable restrictions and convey them to
the artist in advance so that the ultimate product conforms to the specifica-
tions.20 5 Should the property owner fail to do so, he has a reasonable
opportunity to have the artist recreate the piece so that it does comply with the
regulations. By contrast, where a property owner seeks to preserve uncommis-
sioned art, requiring the same level of conformance with a sign regulation is
unconstitutional.20 6 The property owner in this latter scenario has no control
over the process through which the art is created. Furthermore, working
with the graffitist to recreate an uncommissioned piece to comply with regu-
lations is not a viable option because graffitists remain largely elusive-not
surprising considering that they are engaging in an illegal act of trespass.
C. Presumptive Protection of Private Property
Beyond the alternative channels analysis-indeed, as part of any First
Amendment inquiry-courts consider the forum in which speech occurs.
First Amendment protection is particularly strong when a property owner
engages in speech on his private land.2"7 Because courts routinely hold that
limitations on the display of non-obscene, publically visible art on private
property are unconstitutional, this instills in uncommissioned art an addi-
tional element of presumptive protection. The forum consideration relates
closely to the alternative channels inquiry, as one's private land is often the
venue of last resort for a speaker to convey his message publicly.208
Courts have granted robust First Amendment protection to artworks locat-
ed on private property. In United States ex rel. Radich v. Criminal Court of
204. Some arguments set forth in this Note would apply even to commissioned art. For
instance, if a sign ordinance completely prevented a property owner from displaying artwork
publicly, this would pose First Amendment problems. See supra Section IV.B.1. The graffiti
abatement ordinances discussed in Section I.C. 1 are inapplicable to commissioned art--even
if the art contains what looks like graffiti writing-since these laws only pertain to works
created without advance authorization from the property owner.
205. Although the time, place, and manner test would likely be satisfied in such an in-
stance, other First Amendment doctrines could make the ordinance unconstitutional. For
example, the sign ordinance could be an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. See, e.g.,
Mahaney v. City of Englewood, 226 P.3d 1214, 1220 (Colo. App. 2010).
206. Given the distinction this Note draws between commissioned and uncommissioned
art, a property owner who wishes to display outdoor art on his property and avoid complying
with sign regulations might contract with an artist to make a work appear uncommissioned.
Collusion between property owners and artists is beyond the scope of this Note, however.
207. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994) ("A special respect for individual
liberty in the home has long been part of our culture and our law; that principle has special
resonance when the government seeks to constrain a person's ability to speak there." (citation
omitted)); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (per curiam); Papineau v. Parmley,
465 F3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 2006).
208. Although property owners would not be "speaking" but for the involvement of a
third party-the graffitist-this does not undermine the validity of the "last resort" argument
since the property owner could not, for instance, display an uncommissioned artwork on pub-
lic property.
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New York, described in Section Il.B.2, a federal district court held that a flag
desecration ordinance, which city officials attempted to invoke to preclude a
private gallery owner from displaying anti-Vietnam War flag art visible to
passersby, violated the gallery owner's First Amendment rights.209 Similarly,
in Nelson v. Streeter, the Seventh Circuit held that a controversial painting
by a student at the School of the Art Institute of Chicago, which parodied a
Chicago politician, could not be removed by city aldermen without violating
the student's First Amendment rights. 210 The court noted that because the
Art Institute was privately owned property, "officials [had] no more right to
enter it uninvited and take the art off its walls than they would have to enter
a private home and take 'offensive' art off its walls. 21
Cases involving the display of artworks on public property provide a
useful contrast to Radich and Nelson. Unlike a private citizen who conveys a
message in a public forum by orating it or wearing it on his clothing, art
displayed on public property is largely detached from its "speaker." Viewers
may therefore erroneously assume that the government is associated with, or
supports, the message conveyed by the art simply because the art is situated
on public property. To avoid such faulty attributions, courts often give the
government a freer hand in regulating art on public property than in regulat-
ing messages orated by private citizens in public forums.2 12 In Serra v.
United States General Services Administration, for instance, the General
Services Administration ("GSA"), a U.S. governmental agency, commis-
sioned artist Richard Serra to create an outdoor sculpture for the Federal
Plaza in Manhattan.2 13 After five years of public display, the GSA decided to
relocate the sculpture in response to public criticism that it obstructed the
Plaza and was a possible safety hazard.2" 4 The court held that the GSA's de-
cision was a reasonable time, place, and manner limitation that left open
sufficient alternative channels of communication. 215 Weighing in the court's
decision was that the work was on public property.216
Although speech occurring on a speaker's own property does receive
heightened protection in the First Amendment analysis, the Court recognizes
that a speaker's (property owner's) rights must be balanced against those of
209. 385 F. Supp. 165, 168-69, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
210. 16 F.3d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1994).
211. Nelson, 16 F.3d at 148; cf Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding
that a public university could revoke permission given to an artist to exhibit a painting on
school premises).
212. Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971) (holding that the government
must allow a citizen to wear a jacket expressing a controversial message in a public court-
house), with Claudio v. United States, 836 F Supp. 1230, 1235-36 (E.D.N.C. 1993), aff'd, 28
F.3d 1208 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that the government can refuse to display controversial
artwork in a public courthouse).
213. 847 F2d 1045, 1046-47 (2d Cir. 1988).
214. Serra, 847 F.2d at 1047-48.
215. Id. at 1049-50.
216. See id. at 1048-51; see also, e.g., Claudio, 836 F. Supp. at 1235-37.
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listeners (viewers of uncommissioned art). Speech directed at a truly captive
audience does not merit protection under the First Amendment.217
In most environments, the Court places the onus on would-be listeners
to avoid speech they do not wish to receive; 21 8 in the privacy of one's own
home, however, the calculus is different. One's residence is his final retreat,
and the Court acknowledges an individual's right to avoid being a captive
listener within his own home.21 9 This could be a particular concern for a
homeowner seeking to preserve uncommissioned art in a residential setting
where the piece is foreign to the larger landscape. Neighbors, if forced to
view the art on an everyday basis, could have a valid captive audience ar-
gument. In a commercial context, however, where space is likely more
visually cluttered with advertising and other signage, the captive audience
problem is less a concern.
Two cases addressing the captive audience issue provide some guidance
on how a court might apply the doctrine to a case involving art. In Close v.
Lederle, the court relied on the captive audience doctrine to reject an artist's
First Amendment claim, holding that displaying paintings of nude figures in
a state university corridor regularly accessed by the public would force
passersby to become unwilling viewers. 2 ° In Radich, by contrast, where art
was displayed inside a private gallery but visible to passersby on the street,
the court rejected a captive audience argument.22' Close and Radich are im-
perfect for application to uncommissioned art, however, as neither involves
the outdoor display of art on private property.
This Note recognizes the captive audience problem as a potential hurdle
in a property owner's endeavor to retain uncommissioned art. Rather than
deeming this a per se obstacle in the First Amendment analysis, however,
the issue should be approached on a case-by-case basis, 22 remembering that
217. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988). An audience is "captive" when
forced to listen to speech it does not wish to receive, without any means of avoiding the mes-
sage. See id.
218. E.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975); LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-19, at 948 (2d ed. 1988) ("Outside the
home, the burden is generally on the observer or listener to avert his eyes or plug his ears
against the verbal assaults, lurid advertisements, tawdry books and magazines, and other 'of-
fensive' intrusions which increasingly attend urban life.").
219. SMOLLA, supra note 84, § 5:4 (Supp. 2011) ("Out of respect for the intense privacy
values associated with the home in American law and culture, the Supreme Court often has
upheld regulations designed to shelter individuals from uninvited speech in their homes."); see
also Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484-85.
220. See 424 F.2d 988, 989-91 (lst Cir. 1970). The art in Close may have been inde-
pendently objectionable for its depiction of human genitalia in a hallway often used by
children, id. at 990, and thus-though it fell short of obscenity--entitled to little First
Amendment protection irrespective of the captive audience problem.
221. United States ex rel. Radich v. Criminal Court of N.Y.C., 385 F Supp. 165, 178-79
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
222. See Galina Krasilovsky, Note, A Sculpture Is Worth a Thousand Words: The First
Amendment Rights of Homeowners Publicly Displaying Art on Private Property, 20 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. &ARTS 521, 551 (1996).
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the Court invokes the captive audience rationale to proscribe speech "spar-
ingly."223 One commentator, for instance, posits that the only outdoor
artworks on private property that would run afoul of this doctrine would
typically warrant removal for reasons independent of the captive audience
problem, such as their "interference with the state's interest in protecting
children from indecent speech. '224 Finally, in analyzing this issue, courts
must keep in mind that viewers' mere objections to the aesthetic or message
conveyed by a work of uncommissioned art are insufficient to invoke the
captive audience rationale successfully.225
In applying the time, place, and manner test to uncommissioned art, the
presumptive protection given to a speaker's expression on his own property
is important to consider alongside the alternative channels analysis. One's
private land is the locale of last resort when a speaker has no other options
to communicate his message to a public audience. Although compromising
the privacy of unwilling viewers would pose a captive audience problem, a
court must strike a delicate balance, acknowledging that property owners
wishing to express themselves through uncommissioned art likely have no
viable alternative outlets for expression.
CONCLUSION
Artists such as Banksy and Shepard Fairey have revitalized interest in
graffiti as an art form and given rise to conflicts between a property owner's
desire to express himself through uncommissioned art and land-use regula-
tions that seek to preserve peace, order, and aesthetics in the community. At
the core of First Amendment jurisprudence is the power of speech to gener-
ate a rich public discourse by challenging audiences to question their
deepest beliefs and consider new points of view. Requiring removal of un-
commissioned art would defy First Amendment goals by insulating
communities from messages and aesthetics they find unpalatable, while
compromising the fundamental constitutional rights of speakers to express
themselves to a public audience. Graffiti abatement ordinances and sign
regulations that require a property owner to shield his uncommissioned art
from public view leave insufficient alternative channels for the property
owner's expression, and are therefore unconstitutional.
223. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011).
224. Krasilovsky, supra note 222.
225. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) ("The ability of government
... to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it ... depend[s] upon a showing
that substantial privacy interests are being invaded .... Any broader view of this authority
would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal
predilections."); Krasilovsky, supra note 222.
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